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Why is China resisting a nuclear treaty with the US and Russia?

Why is China resisting a nuclear treaty with the US and Russia?

Al Jazeera – Breaking News, World News and Video from Al Jazeera
16 lis 2026, 08:11Other
Oryginał
3 min read

President Donald Trump will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen this week to discuss a new nuclear arms treaty, but China has signaled reluctance to join such an agreement.

The world's top nuclear-armed countries are preparing for their first-ever trilateral meeting as Trump pushes for a new nuclear arms treaty among them. The meeting will take place on the sidelines of the APEC summit in China's Shenzhen. The New START treaty, which lapsed in February after more than half a century of limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, is at the top of the agenda for Washington and Moscow.

Historical Context

New START was signed in 2010 by then-US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, setting limits of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads and 700 long-range missiles and bombers for both countries. The treaty built upon earlier agreements like START I (1991) and START II (1993, never implemented). On-site inspections between the US and Russia ended during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, leaving them dependent on their own intelligence for compliance verification.

US Motivations

Trump wants China included because Washington believes a bilateral treaty with only Russia no longer reflects the global nuclear balance. Today, the United States faces threats from multiple nuclear powers. In short, a bilateral treaty with only one nuclear power is simply inappropriate in 2026 and going forward, said US Undersecretary of State Thomas DiNanno. Rubio emphasized that to have true arms control in the 21st century, it's impossible to do something that doesn't include China because of their vast and rapidly growing stockpile. A new agreement would need to address both existing and novel Russian nuclear systems and China's expanding arsenal.

China's Reluctance

China's opposition stems from the significant disparity in nuclear capabilities. With an estimated 620 warheads compared to over 5,000 each for the US and Russia, China maintains a minimum deterrence posture. China's nuclear forces are not on the same level as those of the United States and Russia, and China will not participate in disarmament negotiations at this stage, said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian.

China maintains a declared no-first-use policy and a 'minimum deterrence' posture – nuclear weapons as political instruments for assured retaliation, not warfighting.

Zhao Minghao, professor at China's Fudan University

Strategic Concerns

China's reluctance is also driven by strategic concerns about US missile defenses, precision-strike capabilities, and emerging technologies that could weaken its retaliatory capability. Chinese assessments also consider US missile defences, precision-strike capabilities and emerging technologies that could weaken its retaliatory capability, said Sun Chenghao of Tsinghua University. Beijing views arms control as potentially limiting its nuclear modernization while the US has withdrawn from previous treaties like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

China's nuclear arsenal is growing faster than any other country's – by about 100 new warheads annually since 2023 – raising questions about its ultimate ambitions. It is difficult to assess China's ultimate ambitions when it provides little transparency about its nuclear programme, said Alejandro Reyes of the University of Hong Kong.

Path Forward

Analysts suggest China might engage in trilateral negotiations only after the US and Russia reduce their arsenals toward genuine parity. A practical starting point could combine US-Russian arms negotiations with three-way discussions on crisis communication, nuclear doctrines and human control over AI-enabled nuclear systems, according to Sun. However, political trust remains the fundamental obstacle, with each side viewing others' modernization programs as potentially threatening. The likeliest near-term outcome is not a treaty but informal restraints while formal arms control waits for a geopolitical thaw, Zhao concluded.

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