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BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server

BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing Server

The Hacker News
16 lis 2026, 07:51Cybersec News
Oryginał
4 min read

A months-long cyberattack on an unspecified Russian software developer has been traced to the BO Team group, which exploited a Log4Shell vulnerability in VMware vCenter to compromise the company's entire IT infrastructure and code-signing server.

The investigation began in June 2025 when the Russian software developer contacted Kaspersky's ICS CERT team about suspicious activity. The resulting analysis revealed a sophisticated intrusion that spanned several months and compromised every component of the organization's IT environment.

The threat actor, known as BO Team (also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy), is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin. The group focuses on cyber espionage and hacktivism, with a primary goal of degrading the Russian military-industrial complex and engaging in cognitive warfare.

BO Team is known to deploy ransomware and publicize its exploits on a Telegram channel, but this specific attack did not involve data destruction or a public claim of responsibility. Instead, the attackers focused on entrenching themselves within the victim's network.

Instead, the attackers worked to entrench themselves in the victim's network by setting up convenient command channels and planting backdoors to restore access in case it was lost.

Kaspersky

Initial breach via VMware vCenter

The attackers initially gained access to the organization's Linux terminal server by exploiting an exposed SSH service. From this foothold, they conducted reconnaissance to identify systems with accessible services such as SMB, Kerberos, SSH, and WinRM.

The investigation found that the threat actor attempted to log in to the VMware vCenter web interface but failed. However, they eventually targeted a VMware vCenter server running version 7.0.3, which was vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, also known as Log4Shell.

By exploiting this critical vulnerability, BO Team obtained remote command line access with root privileges. They then connected to the hypervisor over SSH and deployed a backdoor that was executed every hour via a shell script planted in the '/etc/cron.hourly/' directory.

The script, named 'pgcache,' was designed to download and run the Global Socket (GSocket) utility from 'lo1yaizaeghaevarooD1ahtaichootae.nofrillsdns[.]com,' enabling the attackers to gain remote control of the compromised host.

The attackers used the nofrillsdns[.]com service, which allows users to create domain names for free by calling the curl utility. They set the DNS record to 127.0.0.1 by default, which the script checks; activating the backdoor requires only a change to the DNS record.

Escalation and credential theft

Following the initial compromise, BO Team executed a series of complex actions to escalate privileges and steal credentials. They gained access to the corporate proxy server and abused the hypervisor's certificate to place backdoors on a second virtualization cluster.

The attackers collected information about virtual machines and firewall rules, and accessed guest OS command-line interpreters. They also breached the GitLab platform, seizing the server's private key and gaining access to repositories containing source code.

Using the GitLab private key, the group connected to the organization's Ansible orchestration system. They also located credentials for several domain accounts and connected to the domain controller using the account of a system administrator, likely after accessing the memory of compromised virtual machines.

The attackers attempted to dump the lsass.exe process using the Nanodump utility to obtain credentials of domain administrators. After the activity was detected and blocked, they deleted the event logs to cover their tracks.

They used system utilities such as comsvcs.dll to create a memory dump of lsass.exe and used regedit.exe to decrypt the Active Directory domain database ('ntds.dit') to extract the credentials of all domain users.

The attackers ultimately compromised the entire Windows infrastructure by connecting to the domain controller using the Kerberos ticket of a domain administrator. This was possible because the same password was used for system administrator accounts in different domains.

Targeting the code-signing server

The investigation revealed that the attackers targeted a server used to sign compiled builds of the commercial software developed by the organization. Kaspersky noted that this server held particular interest for the hackers.

Attackers may be interested in such a server for two reasons. First, they may try to carry out a supply chain attack by injecting malicious code into a product build right before it is signed. Second, the attackers may try to steal the organization's digital signature to use later to sign malware.

Kaspersky

The attackers attempted to execute a malicious WMI script and install a backdoor similar to the Linux variant in the temporary files directory. They also modified '/usr/bin/nxnode-login' to intercept and write user credentials to a shared-memory file.

The group used living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques, obfuscated malware code, and systematic deletion of event logs to complicate detection efforts. They also dressed up malware files as legitimate software like tasklist.exe and findstr.exe.

After the incident was detected and countermeasures were enacted, BO Team orchestrated a phishing campaign in late July to collect employee credentials. The email, with the subject line 'Account disconnected from the mail server,' bypassed SPF and DKIM checks.

The attackers used a service that automatically generates phishing pages, loading the targeted organization's official website and displaying a password entry form on top. The information was sent to the attackers, but the campaign was detected and prevented.

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