New facilities in Laos and Cambodia: Is China expanding its military presence in Southeast Asia?
China and Laos have opened a joint military support and training center at Ban Keun airfield, while China also expanded its footprint at Cambodia's Ream naval base.
China is expanding its military footprint in mainland Southeast Asia through new facilities in Laos and Cambodia, signaling a shift from purely economic ties to deeper security cooperation.
The initiative follows a high-level meeting in Beijing where China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi invited counterparts from Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar to discuss closer economic and security cooperation.
Analysts note that while China has long been a dominant economic force in the region, the recent developments mark a tangible step towards enhancing its military operational capabilities.
New airbase in Laos
At the end of September, China and Laos inaugurated a joint military support and training center at Ban Keun airfield, north of Vientiane. The facility is intended to train Laotian air force pilots.
Satellite images analyzed by Reuters show that the base is home to four K-8 Chinese two-seat intermediate jet trainers and light attack aircraft, alongside military transporters and helicopters.
However, the runway at Ban Keun is only 2,000 meters long, which is too short for large Chinese bombers that typically require 3,000 meters of space.
It remains to be seen how this [Ban Keun] will change China's military access to Southeast Asia.
Bünte argues that the new facility represents another step towards deepening military cooperation between Laos and China, potentially granting Beijing strategic depth in mainland Southeast Asia and better access to the South China Sea.
Johann Fuhrmann, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's Beijing office, cautions that the situation is more complex than it appears.
China gains influence when it co-designs the training and operation of such facilities over several years.
Fuhrmann emphasizes that distinguishing between training Laotian pilots and any potential future use of the facilities by Chinese armed forces is crucial.
Cambodia's Ream naval base
China has also significantly expanded its presence at Cambodia's Ream naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, using the facility for logistics and training.
While Japanese and Vietnamese ships are allowed to dock at the port, they are restricted to a southern quay. It remains unclear whether other navies can use the same facilities under the same conditions as China.
The base has been a point of contention, with satellite images from 2022 showing the extent of Chinese involvement in its construction and development.
Fuhrmann questions the long-term implications of these arrangements, specifically regarding the rights China will be granted.
Will China have to obtain the approval of the respective government for every new use? Or are there longer-term commitments that both sides can invoke, even in times of crisis?
Regional reactions and future outlook
Surrounding countries are reacting differently to China's growing influence, with some, like Vietnam and the Philippines, closely monitoring developments due to their own territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Vietnam has declared that any military cooperation must serve peace and stability, referring to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
Bünte suggests that these are currently individual steps and that it is too early to determine if they will lead to a broader military alliance in the years to come.
He notes that smaller Asian nations are hedging their bets, trying to expand their relationship with China without severing ties with the United States or other Western nations.
Ultimately, a counterweight can only be achieved through tangible contributions, not through warnings or lectures from Europe.
Fuhrmann believes that Western nations should focus on strengthening the smaller countries in the region through tangible contributions rather than warnings or lectures.
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