
The ANC’s implosion was decades in the making
South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) saw its popular vote decline to 32.5% in the 2026 local government elections, becoming increasingly dependent on coalition partners in urban areas while losing minority support.
The African National Congress (ANC) remains South Africa's largest political party but has seen its popular vote plummet to 32.5% in the 2026 local government elections. This dramatic decline has effectively transformed the ANC into a predominantly rural party, increasingly dependent on coalition partners to govern urban metros and cities.
The party has lost significant minority voter support, with substantial segments of the Black middle class and portions of the Black African rural and working classes expressing disaffection through defection and abstention. This shift has left the ANC facing a more confident white community that has been surprised at how quickly Black political power has diminished since the end of apartheid.
Nine developing years
The foundations of the ANC's current crisis were laid during President Thabo Mbeki's nine-year leadership (1999-2008), which despite challenges like the HIV/AIDS epidemic, delivered substantial economic benefits. These years saw GDP growth of 5.4%, unemployment at 25%, and significant savings for infrastructure expansion.
Under Mbeki, the ANC secured an impressive 65.7% of the vote in the 2006 local elections, with its highest ever proportion of minority votes. However, this period also sowed seeds of left-wing impatience regarding the pace of wealth redistribution from economic growth.
Nine devastating years
The advantages gained during Mbeki's era were largely squandered during Jacob Zuma's nine-year presidency (2009-2018), characterized by what the author terms 'state capture' disguised as 'radical economic transformation.' Multiple commissions revealed systemic corruption: the Madlanga Commission exposed the perversion of the criminal justice system, the Nugent Commission revealed larceny in revenue services, and the Zondo Commission demonstrated how public enterprises became cash cows for the corrupt.
The economic cost of state capture has been estimated at up to 500 billion rand ($30 billion). This devastation brought Cyril Ramaphosa to power on a wave of 'Ramaphoria,' with many hoping he would lead the party's renewal. His popularity initially endured even through the challenges of the COVID-19 lockdown.
Nine dithering years
Ramaphosa's leadership (2018-present) is characterized by 'dithering' - hesitation, indecision and uncertainty. The author notes that while Zuma operated through 'crimes of commission,' Ramaphosa has operated through 'omission' - failing to take necessary actions. Notably, despite court orders, Zuma served minimal prison time, allowing his uMkhonto weSizwe Party to capture nearly 15% of the national vote in 2024 and almost 10% in 2026.
Under Ramaphosa, the ANC has carried forward 'skeletons of malfeasance' with complicit individuals either tolerated or elevated. The party failed to address urgent governance issues and popular discontent over basic services. Instead of addressing these problems, ANC leadership made damaging public statements, with the president praising Democratic Alliance governance while the chairperson suggested ANC councillors could 'sing but not govern.'
Economically, South Africa faces devastating statistics with youth unemployment at 63%. ANC electoral support has steadily declined from 57.5% in 2019 to 32.5% in 2026, as the party has been 'cannibalized' by insurgencies from Zuma's MKP to Julius Malema's EFF to the South African Communist Party.
From renewal to survival?
The ANC now faces an existential 'poly-crisis' encompassing electoral, organizational, ideological and moral dilemmas. The party must decide whether to continue partnering with the Democratic Alliance (which helped make the DA more palatable) or reach to the left, risking reunification with forces associated with state capture. Organizationally, the ANC appears to lack strategic talent and relies on blunt approaches to maintain its base.
The author suggests a potential path forward: Ramaphosa's leadership could admit failure, remain for stability until 2027, while establishing a transitional team to guide the ANC through necessary changes by the 2029 elections. The ANC needs to maintain governance footholds to make amends and regain public trust, but faces the critical question of whether it possesses the 'dexterity and finesse' to navigate this challenging transition.