The Gulf must build security that can outlast this war

The decision marks another step towards Gulf states taking greater collective responsibility for their security. One day earlier, after meeting Qatar's prime minister, US President Donald Trump had said: "Iran militarily is effectively over." He also said the US blockade would continue and left open further military action.

His remarks fell short of announcing an agreed end to the war. Any opening for diplomacy deserves support. But even a lasting agreement would leave the Gulf's underlying security problems unresolved.

Complex Security Challenges

The Kuwait command's value will depend on implementation and on how it connects with the region's other security partnerships. The answer requires abandoning the expectation that one grand security arrangement can resolve every threat facing the region.

Iran's attacks on Gulf states during this war, together with Israel's September 2025 strike on Qatar, demonstrate the breadth of the challenge. A security architecture designed around only one adversary will leave serious gaps.

Layered Security Approach

The most credible response to this complex set of threats is a security architecture that is both layered and networked. Gulf states are already moving in this direction. The task now is to make those arrangements work together and sustain the effort when the immediate pressure of war recedes.

Layering starts with the recognition that different partnerships do different jobs. National capabilities and cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council provide the foundation. The relationship with the United States remains central, while additional arrangements address needs that a single partner cannot meet.

Cooperation with US Central Command supplies an operational layer. The air and missile defence coordination cell opened at Al Udeid in January, for example, was designed to improve regional coordination, share threat warnings and prepare for contingencies.

Networked Partnerships

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, adds a collective defence commitment among its members. The Badr memorandum, signed in October by Qatar, Turkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, sets out cooperation in defence manufacturing, research and technical training.

These arrangements should be judged by the gaps they fill. Collective defence, operational coordination and industrial capacity reinforce one another, but none can substitute for the others. The next step is to connect these layers so that capabilities developed through one partnership strengthen what countries can do through another.

Qatar offers a useful example. It shares GCC membership with Saudi Arabia and participates in Badr alongside Turkiye and Pakistan. It therefore connects to all three Mecca signatories through other arrangements, despite not being a party to Mecca itself.