We crossed the Rubicon with Iran, so we can’t stop halfway

America has crossed the Rubicon with Iran. There is no going back to the world that existed before this war, no matter how much we might wish otherwise. We have attacked Iran's military infrastructure, inflicted enormous damage on its economy and demonstrated that the United States is prepared to use overwhelming force. Now, at precisely the moment when we have gained the upper hand, Washington seems increasingly preoccupied with how quickly we can declare victory, bring down gasoline prices and move on.

That would be a terrible mistake. The question is whether America is about to squander the military advantage it has gained over Iran. The answer depends on whether we understand the difference between stopping a war and achieving the objectives for which we fought it.

Regime History

We need to be clear about the regime we are dealing with. The Islamic Republic is not simply another country with which we have disagreements over trade, borders or diplomatic recognition. Since 1979, hostility toward America and Israel has been woven into the regime's revolutionary ideology. That is not a judgment about the Iranian people, many of whom want nothing more than a normal life. It is a judgment about the government that has ruled them for nearly half a century.

Look at the history. In 1979, Iranian revolutionaries seized our embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. In 1983, Hezbollah, which Iran helped create and arm, carried out the Beirut Marine barracks bombing that killed 241 American servicemen. In 1994, the bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires killed 85 people; an Argentine court subsequently held Iran responsible and concluded that Hezbollah carried out the attack. In 2011, American authorities uncovered an Iranian-linked plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in a Washington restaurant, potentially killing innocent Americans.

Nuclear Threat

Before this war, Iran had developed an extraordinary combination of nuclear expertise, ballistic missiles, drones, underground facilities and regional proxy networks. By June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, technically close to the roughly 90% level associated with weapons-grade material. That did not mean Iran possessed a functioning nuclear weapon, but it demonstrated how far its enrichment program had advanced.

The original nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, should have taught us an important lesson. Iran accepted temporary restrictions but retained the scientific expertise, industrial infrastructure and technical capacity to rebuild its nuclear program. When those restrictions unraveled, Tehran demonstrated how rapidly it could advance toward weapons-grade enrichment. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered undeclared nuclear material and activities that raised serious questions about Iran's transparency.

Sustained Strategy

Imagine two Middle Easts five years from now. In the first, Washington announces that the war is over. The military goes home. The pressure comes off. Oil prices decline, at least initially, and everyone celebrates. Meanwhile, Iran's surviving leadership quietly begins rebuilding its missile factories, drone production facilities and underground nuclear infrastructure. Money starts flowing again to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other armed groups.

Now imagine the second Middle East. We continue negotiating, but also maintain tough financial sanctions, lawful maritime pressure and an active military component. When intelligence establishes that Iran is restoring threatening military capabilities, and force is legally justified, we retain the ability and willingness to act. Missile and drone manufacturing remain constrained. Nuclear reconstruction is subject to verification and credible consequences.

Three-Pronged Approach

Our strategy needs three legs, and all three must operate simultaneously. The first is diplomacy. We should negotiate continuously and seriously, offering Iran a verifiable path toward reduced isolation in exchange for meaningful nuclear restrictions, an end to threatening regional activities and respect for freedom of navigation.

The second is economic pressure. Financial sanctions, restrictions on weapons-related technology and lawful enforcement around the Strait of Hormuz must continue to limit the regime's ability to finance military reconstruction and its proxy networks. The third is maintaining military readiness to act when intelligence indicates Iran is rebuilding threatening capabilities.