Can Iran’s new supreme leader make peace from behind the scenes?

Since succeeding his father in March, Mojtaba Khamenei has exercised power without appearing in public or allowing his voice to be heard. He has governed through written statements and decrees, while reports of his meetings with senior officials offer insight into his leadership style. The four meetings announced within 11 days in October involved the heads of Iran's parliament, judiciary and national security establishment, as well as senior military commanders, suggesting a new decision-making system is taking shape.

New Command Structure

The October meetings followed appointments to replace military and security commanders killed in the war. In August, Khamenei appointed his military adviser Mohsen Rezaei as his representative on the Supreme National Security Council, who later became its secretary. Six military appointments followed, including Ali Abdollahi as chief of the Armed Forces General Staff and Ahmad Vahidi as commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Abdollahi was also instructed to complete the merger of the General Staff with Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. At his first reported meeting with the reconstituted military leadership on October 31, Abdollahi, army commander Amir Hatami and Vahidi reportedly briefed Khamenei on military readiness in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman.

Diplomatic Coordination

These consultations unfolded alongside intensive diplomatic mediation. On October 20, Pakistan's army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir carried a Qatari-Pakistani compromise proposal to Tehran, envisioning unannounced inspections of nuclear facilities in exchange for Iran receiving interest on its frozen funds in Qatar. Khamenei's meeting with Iran's chief negotiator Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf was announced the following day.

On October 26, Munir returned with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. Their discussions produced an understanding that regional security was the responsibility of the region's own states. Rezaei also announced that Tehran had sent Washington a proposal concerning the Strait of Hormuz with a seven-day deadline.

Strategic Dilemma

In his meetings, Khamenei has sent parallel messages: insisting on Iran's conditions for ending the war while demanding immediate retaliation against any threat without geographical limits. He emphasized that Iran would decide when any renewed confrontation ended. The statements suggest awareness of competing views within Iran's political elite over war and negotiations.

The gap between Washington and Tehran remains wide. The US wants nuclear concessions before negotiations resume, while Tehran first wants the naval blockade lifted, frozen assets released and oil exports restored. Khamenei spoke of conditions 'set by the country's officials', not by himself, distributing responsibility among institutions and preserving room to embrace or disown an eventual outcome.

2015 Comparison

There are echoes of the lengthy consultations before the 2015 nuclear agreement, but significant differences. The earlier process lasted around two years under sanctions, not war, and was led by diplomats rather than figures with IRGC backgrounds like Ghalibaf and Rezaei. The mediation channel has shifted from Oman to Qatar and the countries of the Mecca Agreement.

Most importantly, 'heroic flexibility' in 2013 was presented as preparation for an agreement, while today's conditions for settlement sit alongside an expanded list of military targets. The deficit of trust has deepened due to the wars of June 2025 and February 2026, creating a layer of mistrust that no technical agreement can easily overcome.

The question remains whether this new system, with its new commanders and parallel messages of compromise and deterrence, can make a decision as consequential as the one in 2015, when war has raised the political cost of flexibility beyond what a leader who has yet to appear publicly may be able to bear.