Russia is selling Africa dependence disguised as partnership
Russia is hosting its third Russia-Africa summit this week, with President Vladimir Putin seeking to expand Moscow's economic, military and political reach across the continent despite failing to deliver on previous commitments.
Putin is scheduled to cochair Thursday's plenary session with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the African Union. Alongside the summit, a two-day economic and humanitarian forum will discuss investment, industrial production, food security, energy, technology and payment systems. Organisers have placed trade and investment at the centre of the programme with a new plan for 2027-2029 expected to advance what they call "mutually beneficial cooperation".
On August 20, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova outlined plans for another substantial round of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts at the Moscow summit. The Sochi gathering in October 2019 produced 92 agreements, and Putin pledged to double annual trade to $40bn. Four years later, the July 2023 summit in St Petersburg yielded 161 more accords and a 2023-2026 action plan.
Trade shortfall
The economic results have not matched Moscow's promises. As the 2023-2026 plan nears its conclusion, Russia's own trade statistics expose the shortfall: Merchandise trade with Africa reached just $27.1bn in 2025 against Putin's $40bn target. The trade imbalance persisted into 2026 with Russia exporting $14bn in goods to Africa during the first eight months of the year while importing just $3.2bn.
Agricultural exports help explain Africa's significant trade deficit with Russia. In the first half of 2026 alone, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to Africa, with Egypt its largest agricultural customer. These supplies meet genuine food security needs, but exports of wheat and fertiliser benefit Russian producers more than they contribute to African industrial development.
Unequal partnerships
Russia's investment record exposes a substantial gap between agreements signed and projects completed. At the 2019 summit, fertiliser producer Uralchem and Angola's Grupo Opaia agreed to build a $1.2bn ammonia and urea complex, scheduled to begin production in 2023, but Uralchem abandoned the venture that year. Egypt offers clearer evidence of progress: Rosatom is building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa, where more than 18,000 Egyptians are employed in their construction. But the project is being financed largely through a $25bn Russian loan that Egypt must repay with interest.
In the Republic of Congo, a proposed petroleum-products pipeline between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville would give Russian interests 90 percent of the joint venture and Congo's state oil company 10 percent with a 25-year concession and guaranteed transport tariffs.
Military footprint
Russia's commercial ambitions are matched by a widening military footprint. On October 8, Sweden's Defence Research Agency identified at least 57 Russian military and security agreements involving 39 African countries, although many remain limited in practice. Others facilitate training and access to military infrastructure. Russia initially relied on the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked mercenary network, before transferring many operations to the Ministry of Defence-controlled Africa Corps with Wagner remaining active in the Central African Republic.
Mali exposes the limits of Russia's military assistance. Wagner fighters and Malian troops captured Kidal, a strategic northern city, in November 2023, only to lose it to separatist rebels in April 2026. On October 6, Russian-backed forces regained the city after an air campaign prompted the rebels to withdraw. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, Malian forces and Russia's Africa Corps carried out 49 air strikes from April to August, killing 89 civilians.
Protecting allies
At the same time, Russia has proved its value to allied rulers in the region. On August 29, Russia's Africa Corps helped General Abdourahamane Tiani crush a mutiny in Niger. Russian troops provided ground and aerial support, and Moscow's ambassador confirmed their role. In the Central African Republic, Moscow has helped President Faustin-Archange Touadera, in power for 10 years, tighten his grip on the country. On March 5, Touadera personally thanked Putin, acknowledging that Russian security forces had made possible December's presidential election, which secured his third term despite an opposition boycott.
For continued protection of Touadera's government, Moscow reportedly demanded close to 14 million euros ($15.7m) a month to deploy Africa Corps in place of Wagner while Russian-linked companies continued profiting from the Central African Republic's gold resources. Russia is also helping friendly rulers shape the information their citizens receive. In July, Russia's state broadcaster RT signed a content-sharing agreement with Tafouk TV, the new channel run by the military governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
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