
Can Russia broker a new US-Iran deal?
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has arrived in Tehran to discuss Moscow's potential role as a mediator in nuclear talks between Washington and Tehran.
Lavrov’s visit follows two recent meetings between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin, signalling a deepening of diplomatic ties. Media reports indicate that Moscow has formally offered to facilitate negotiations between the United States and Iran regarding a potential new nuclear agreement.
Russia’s bid for mediation is underpinned by its unique combination of capabilities and interests. As a major nuclear power, it possesses the technical expertise to understand the intricacies of Iran’s nuclear programme. This is further bolstered by its state-owned nuclear energy giant, Rosatom, which is a global leader in the field and is currently constructing two new units at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
The relationship between Moscow and Tehran has evolved from one that was long testy into a strategic partnership. This transformation is largely attributed to shared adversaries. Both nations have been targeted by the United States, directly in Iran’s case and indirectly through proxy warfare in Russia’s. A pivotal moment in this alliance was Iran’s transfer of Shahed drone technology to Russia in 2022, aiding its war effort.
The two countries formalised this cooperation with the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in early 2025. While the treaty outlines expanding economic and political ties, it notably omitted a proposed mutual military assistance clause that Russia had suggested. Despite this, critics who argue Russia failed to defend Iran during the 12-day war of 2025 are ill-informed, as the partnership has been repaid with tangible support.
A successful mediation would align with several of Russia’s strategic interests. Moscow hopes that a new nuclear deal would help stabilise the region, thereby unlocking the potential of the International North-South Transport Corridor. This major logistical project, which passes through Iran, is a key priority for Russia’s economic ambitions.
Furthermore, Russia is keen to maintain good relations with Arab Gulf monarchies. It does not wish to jeopardise these ties due to Iran’s retaliatory strikes against their territories, even as it has benefited from a temporary surge in oil prices caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Russia’s experience in nuclear diplomacy is also a significant asset. It was a participant in the eight-party talks that led to the 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This leaves the US in a position where it must rely on Russia or China for mediation, as other former partners have lost standing in both Washington and Tehran.
Recent diplomatic activity underscores this potential. This month, Putin reportedly delivered an Iranian proposal by phone to US President Donald Trump. In parallel, Trump has applied pressure on Ukraine to end the war there, a move that may be part of a broader diplomatic strategy.
The possibility of a trilateral meeting between Trump, Putin, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping is also on the table. Trump has mentioned that such a meeting during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen next month would make sense if it were focused on denuclearisation.
The crises in Eurasia are intrinsically linked, involving the principal geopolitical players of today: the US, China, and Russia. The fact that their leaders are discussing a trilateral meeting is more than a topic for pundits; it may represent a small step to balance ongoing wars with diplomacy.